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Abstract 
Despite increased longevity, many people fail to save the funds necessary to support their 
retirement. In an attempt both to elucidate and remedy this failing, research exploring the ‘future-
self continuity’ hypothesis has revealed that temporal discounting is decreased and saving increased 
when connections between one’s current and future self are strengthened. Here we explored the 
possibility that a basic component of mental imagery — spatial visual perspective — may be an 
important determinant of people’s decisions to spend now or save for the future. The results of two 
experiments supported this prediction. Rates of saving were enhanced when a distant-future event 
was generated from a third-person versus first-person vantage point, an effect that was mediated by 
visual bodily awareness during mental imagery.  
 














Saving For Your Future Self 3 
Saving For Your Future Self: The Role of Imaginary Experiences 
 
Around the world, the number of senior citizens is rising. In 1901, men and women in the 
U.K. lived, on average, until they were around 47 years of age. Fast-forward just over a century to 
2014 and life expectancy had almost doubled (i.e., men ~ 85 years, women ~ 87 years, Public 
Health England, 2016). Although the benefits of living longer are considerable, older adults also 
face a raft of significant challenges during their twilight years. Foremost among these is financial 
stability (McKinsey Global Institute, 2008). To avoid a penurious and miserable existence, 
monetary resources (e.g., savings, pension plans) must keep pace with the escalating costs of 
increased longevity. Herein lies a problem, however. For many older adults, savings rates fall 
woefully short of the levels needed to support a comfortable lifestyle. In the U.S., for example, 
economists have estimated that individuals typically accumulate only a third of the money needed 
to maintain pre-retirement levels of consumption (Berheim, Forni, Gokhale, & Kotlikoff, 2000). 
The situation in the U.K. is similarly bleak, with a staggering 89% of the workforce failing to 
prioritize saving for retirement and 29% having no savings at all (www.uk.reuters.com, 2015). The 
message then is sobering. Failure to act (i.e., save) today can have regrettable consequences 
tomorrow (Ersner-Hershfield, Garton, Ballard, Samanez-Larkin, & Knutson, 2009a). 
 
Saving and Intertemporal Choice 
Overlooking the financial obligations of later life can be traced to a psychological 
phenomenon termed temporal discounting — the tendency to undervalue future rewards, 
particularly when compared to immediate (and often inferior) alternatives (Chapman, 1996; 
Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). For example, a single 
scoop of strawberry ice cream (or $10) today often trumps the promise of an entire carton (or $20) 
in several weeks time. Where finances are concerned, neglecting the future may arise for a variety 
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of reasons. For many individuals, income levels are simply insufficient to enable funds to be 
directed into pension plans or deposit accounts: for others, unavoidable spending commitments in 
the present (e.g., mortgage payments, childcare) overwhelm the benefits of long-term financial 
planning. In other words, when potential insolvency looms large, saving for the future is an 
unrealistic ambition. Even when people possess the capacity to save, however, discounting 
continues to occur. Set against the tepid allure of distant rewards, immediate prizes are more 
arousing, emotional and gratifying (e.g., Mischel, 1974; Mischel, Ebbesen, & Raskoff Zeis, 1972; 
Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Driving these contrasting feelings are differences in the 
products of temporal construal. Whereas experiences in the far-off future tend to be characterized in 
an abstract, conceptual manner, representations of the here-and-now are rich in experiential (e.g., 
hedonic) detail (see Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). Little wonder, therefore, that actions with 
instant gratification (e.g., spending) are so difficult to resist. 
Acknowledging the challenges of intertemporal choice, various remedies have been 
proposed in an attempt to enhance the valuation of future rewards and encourage saving (Ho, Lim, 
& Camerer, 2006). Two in particular have proved popular: either diminish the attraction of the 
present by persuading people to pre-commit to saving at a later date (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; 
Thaler & Benartzi, 2004); or encourage them to consider the benefits that can be accrued from 
diverse ways of spending in the future (Frederick, Novemsky, Wang, Dhar, & Nowlis, 2009; 
Nenkov, Inman, & Hulland, 2008). In other words, lessening the lure of today or increasing the 
appeal (and requirements) of tomorrow facilitates saving. Of theoretical relevance to the current 
inquiry, an interdisciplinary viewpoint has also been advanced that identifies a different pathway to 
improved financial decision-making. According to various philosophers, economists and 
psychologists, a critical determinant of intertemporal choice is the degree to which a person is 
connected with his or her future self (e.g., Hershfield, 2011; Mitchell, Schirmer, Ames, & Gilbert, 
2011; Parfit, 1971, 1987; Schelling, 1984; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). As Bartels and Urminsky (2011, 
Saving For Your Future Self 5 
p. 183) report, “…a person values future outcomes in proportion to how much she feels, at that 
moment, that the current self’s important psychological characteristics will persist in the future self.” 
What this viewpoint therefore implies is that saving for later life should be enhanced when 
continuity between one’s current self and future self is high. 
 
Saving and Future-Self Continuity 
 Underpinning the continuity-based account of intertemporal choice is the assumption that, 
rather than comprising a monolithic, unitary entity, self is a collection of distinct identities that 
overlap with each other (to varying degrees) over time (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Markus & Nurius, 
1986; McConnell, 2011; Roberts & Donahue, 1994). From this standpoint, self-continuity is 
believed to fluctuate as a function of temporal distance, such that a person will feel more congruent 
with her potential self in the near (e.g., 12 months) than distant (e.g., 20 years) future. Indeed, if one 
travels too deeply into the future, psychological connectivity may be severed altogether, with one’s 
future-self acquiring the status of an entirely different person (Mitchell et al., 2011; Parfit, 1971; 
Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 
2008). For example, participants are more likely to ascribe stable personality traits to their distant 
future than current-self (Pronin & Ross, 2006), mirroring their tendency to ascribe dispositional 
attributions to other people (Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Maracek, 1973). The ramifications of this 
temporal discontinuity for financial planning are obvious. If one’s future-self is essentially a 
different person, saving for later life has little appeal (Hershfield, 2011). 
 A substantial body of evidence supports the contention that temporal discounting is 
influenced by future self-continuity (Bartels & Rips, 2010; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011; Ersner-
Hershfield et al., 2009a; Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2009b; Hershfield et al., 2011). In 
a brain imaging investigation, for example, Ersner-Hershfield et al. (2009b) required participants to 
make personality judgments about their current-self, future-self and other people. Among 
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participants for whom thinking about their current and future self was most similar (i.e., as indexed 
by activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), devaluation of monetary rewards over time was 
least pronounced. Bolstering these findings, higher-levels of future self-continuity have also been 
shown to predict actual financial security in the real world. In a sample of working adults (aged 20-
86 years) in San Francisco, future self-similarity was found to be positively associated with 
accumulated assets, such as material possessions, investments, and savings (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 
2009a). 
 If future self-continuity facilitates saving, an important question arises — how can the 
critical connection between one’s current and prospective self be strengthened? In an ingenious 
series of experiments, Hershfield et al. (2011) tackled this problem using immersive virtual 
environments (Blascovich & Bailenson, 2011). Their reasoning was straightforward. Once given an 
opportunity to interact with age-progressed renderings (i.e., self as a senior citizen) of themselves in 
virtual reality (VR), people should experience greater future self-continuity and make smarter (e.g., 
less impatient) monetary decisions. Intriguingly, not only was this exactly what they found, but the 
beneficial effects of this manipulation only emerged when participants had direct exposure to their 
future self, interacting with any elderly avatar did not attenuate temporal discounting and facilitate 
saving (i.e., priming ‘older adults’ did not promote saving, Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Although 
promising, it is worth noting that this intervention rests on the availability of a technology (i.e., VR) 
that is expensive and currently beyond the reach of most individuals.1 Fortunately, however, a 
substitute simulator capable of generating comparable experiences is readily accessible to all — the 
human mind (Gilbert & Wilson, 2009).  
 People spend substantial periods of time imagining their future selves, simulating likely 
events and experiences (Gilbert & Wilson, 2009; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, 2010). They do so for good reason. By previewing the future, it is 
possible to anticipate how best to think, feel and act in just about any conceivable situation (Gilbert 
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& Wilson, 2009). In this regard, perhaps the most potent aspect of Hershfield and colleague’s 
(2011) immersive methodology was not that it served to presage future action, but rather it enabled 
participants (i.e., college students) to preview their appearance in 50 years time. Highlighting the 
physical changes associated with aging (e.g., shrinking, wrinkling, graying, balding) in this way 
likely increased the visual salience of their elderly self (i.e., “that’s how I’ll look when I’m 70”), 
thus strengthened future-self continuity and led participants to prioritize saving over spending 
(Hershfield, 2011). In other words, exposure to their elderly appearance enhanced the connection 
between participants’ current and future selves.  
 As the hypothesized association between visual awareness of the body and future-self 
continuity has yet to be examined (Hershfield et al., 2011), we explored this relation in a 
preliminary investigation (see Supplemental Online Material). As expected, visual awareness of 
their body as an older adult was positively correlated with participants’ estimates of future-self 
continuity. This demonstration is valuable as it affirms that the ability to preview one’s future 
appearance does not necessitate visiting a VR laboratory — mental imagery can trigger comparable 
effects (Gilbert & Wilson, 2009; Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009). As such, much like encountering one’s 
prospective self in an immersive environment (Hershfield et al., 2011), imagining oneself in the 
distant future should have the capacity (at least under certain conditions) to encourage saving, a 
possibility we explored in our first experiment.  
 
Experiment 1 
 A natural property of mental imagery provides an easy conduit to highlight the physical 
changes associated with aging. When simulating future events (e.g., a post-retirement Caribbean 
cruise), one of two vantage points can be adopted. A first-person (i.e., egocentric) perspective in 
which, consistent with perception, events are envisaged though one’s own eyes, or a third-person 
(i.e., allocentric) vantage point whereby episodes are viewed from an outside point-of-view (see 
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Libby & Eibach, 2011). While an extensive literature has demonstrated important vantage-point 
effects on cognition and behavior  (e.g., Christian, Miles, Kenyeri, Mattschey, & Macrae, 2016; 
Christian, Parkinson, Macrae, Miles & Wheatley, 2015; Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2007; 
Libby, Valenti, Hines, & Eibach, 2014; Macrae, Sundar Raj, Best, Christian, & Miles, 2013), 
emphasis in the current experiment falls primarily on the different visual experiences these 
viewpoints provide. Notably, that one’s appearance — hence elderly self — is more visually salient 
when future events are imagined from a third-person than first-person perspective (Frederickson & 
Roberts, 1997; Libby & Eibach, 2011). In turn, this enhanced visual salience should encourage 
saving rather than spending (Hershfield et al., 2011). 
 Interestingly, a similar prediction can be derived from competing — though closely related 
— theoretical approaches. In the cognitive domain, for example, visual perspective has been shown 
to emphasize different types of information. Whereas first-person imagery facilitates access to 
associative evaluations of a simulated event, third-person imagery increases reliance on 
propositional self-knowledge (Libby & Eibach, 2011; Libby et al., 2014). It is entirely possible, 
therefore, that self-relevant knowledge (e.g., ‘being comfortable in later life is important to me’), 
accessed via third-person imagery, may encourage saving over spending (Libby et al., 2014). That 
is, a third-person vantage point may stimulate people to think about the broader meaning of events 
and their relation to oneself, thereby potentially enhancing future-self continuity (Libby & Eibach, 
2011). Relatedly, Construal-level theory (CLT, see Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010) contends that 
people tend to represent psychologically distant events on the basis of their essential, prototypical 
features. It is conceivable, therefore, that abstract construal, triggered via third-person imagery, may 
emphasize prudence over indulgence, at least among individuals for whom saving is an important 
part of their self-concept (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006; Libby et al., 2007, 
2014).  
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 Although several overlapping literatures converge on the prediction that third-person 
imagery should facilitate saving (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010; Libby & Eibach, 2011), the 
current work departs from these viewpoints in that it does not rely on differences in cognitive 
factors, such as self-knowledge or life goals (Libby et al., 2007; Libby et al., 2014), to drive the 
effect of interest.  Instead, simply seeing oneself in the future as an older adult may be sufficient to 
prioritize saving over spending (see also Hershfield et al., 2011). Accordingly, exploiting the 
demonstration that third-person (vs. first-person) imagery tends to be the favored vantage point 
when events in the distant future are simulated (Macrae et al., 2015; Pronin & Ross, 2006), our first 
experiment explored the effects of visual perspective on people’s saving/spending decisions. 
Compared to individuals who report adopting a first-person vantage point when imagining their 
distant-future self, we expected third-person imagers to exhibit a greater propensity to save for a 
later date.  
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred undergraduates (52 females, Mage = 21.20, SD = 1.20) took part in the research 
on a voluntary basis.2 The experiment was reviewed and approved by the School of Psychology’s 
Ethics Committee. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were greeted by a female experimenter and randomly assigned to one of the 
conditions. The experimenter explained that the task entailed a brief period of mental imagery, after 
which aspects of their imaginary experience would be probed. Participants were instructed to 
imagine taking a mid-afternoon walk, along a quiet beach, in 40 years time (i.e., when aged around 
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60 years). Once the instructions were fully understood, participants closed their eyes and spent 20 
seconds imagining the event. 
 Following the guided imagery, participants were required to select, from two possibilities, 
the vantage point that best described the image they had formed of the event (Pronin & Ross, 2006): 
(a) I saw the scene from my original point of view (not as an external observer would see it). I did 
not see myself in the image, since it was as though I was looking at the event through my own eyes; 
or (b) I saw the scene as an observer might see it (not from my original point of view). I saw myself 
in the image, since it was as though I was looking at the event through the eyes of an observer. Next, 
in a modified money allocation task (Hershfield et al., 2011), participants were asked, “If you 
unexpectedly received £1000 (~$1500), how much would you choose to spend at the current time 
and how much would you save for the future?” The values provided were required to sum to £1000 




 A chi-square test confirmed that participants were more likely to simulate the distant future 
from a third-person (62%) than first-person (38%) perspective, χ2 (1, N = 100) = 5.76, p = .016.  
 
Savings 
 An independent samples t-test yielded an effect of the vantage point adopted during mental 
imagery on the proportion of money participants were prepared to save (vs. spend), such that 
savings were greater following third-person (M = .62, SD = .19) than first-person (M = .45, SD 
= .24) imagery, t(98) = 3.92, p < .001, d = 0.81, 95% CI: [.08, .26].   
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Discussion 
 These findings support the prediction that the visual perspective adopted during future-
related imagery can influence saving decisions. Not only did participants prefer third-person (vs. 
first-person) imagery when simulating their distant-future self (Macrae et al., 2015; Pronin & Ross, 
2006), adoption of this vantage point also increased saving rates by around 17% (i.e., £170, ~$255). 
In other words, third-person imagery triggered prudent rather than impatient choices. Although, at 
least in the context of VR, it has been shown that exposure to an impersonal/unfamiliar senior 
citizen does not increase saving (Hershfield et al., 2011), it is feasible that priming effects of this 
kind could emerge during prospection. Accordingly, to rule out this possibility, additional data were 
collected in a task in which participants imagined an elderly adult walking along a beach, after 
which their saving/spending decisions were probed (see Supplemental Online Material). These data 
confirmed that simply imagining an older adult does not encourage saving. 
 
Experiment 2 
Guiding the current investigation is the assumption that the visual salience of one’s future-
self influences saving/spending decisions (Hershfield et al., 2011). Thus far, however, the results of 
Experiment 1 provide only indirect support for this viewpoint. Accordingly, the goal of our second 
experiment was to explore directly the effects of vantage point on visual awareness of the body and 
saving decisions. Modifying the procedure adopted in Experiment 1, on this occasion participants 
were explicitly instructed to visualize a distant-future event (i.e., beach walk) from either a first-
person or third-person vantage point (Macrae et al., 2015), after which their saving/spending 
decisions and levels of bodily awareness during the imaginary experience were probed. We 
expected saving rates to be higher following third-person (vs. first-person) imagery, reflecting 
increased visual salience during mental simulation. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
 One hundred undergraduates (62 females, Mage = 20.92, SD = 1.57) took part in the research 
on a voluntary basis.2 The experiment had a single factor (Visual Perspective: first-person or third-
person) between participants design and was reviewed and approved by the School of Psychology’s 
Ethics Committee. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were greeted by a female experimenter and randomly assigned to one of the 
conditions. The experimenter explained that the task entailed a brief period of mental imagery, after 
which some questions would be asked. Participants were instructed to imagine taking a mid-
afternoon walk, along a quiet beach, in 40 years time (i.e., when aged around 60 years). Prior to the 
guided imagery, participants were instructed about the visual perspective they were required to 
adopt during the task (Libby & Eibach, 2011). Those in the first-person condition were told, “When 
you imagine the beach walk, please picture it from a first-person perspective. Visualize the event 
from your own viewpoint — that is, see the event through your own eyes.” Alternatively, 
participants in the third-person condition were instructed, “When you imagine the beach walk, 
please picture it from a third-person perspective. Visualize the event from an external viewpoint — 
that is, see the event as if through the eyes of another person.” Once the instructions were fully 
understood, participants closed their eyes and spent 20 seconds imagining the event.  
 Following the guided imagery, participants answered two questions. The first question asked, 
“To what extent did you feel visually aware of your body during the beach walk?” Responses were 
given on a 9-point scale with appropriate anchors (i.e., 1 = not at all aware, 9 = highly aware). As in 
Experiment 1, the second question asked, “If you unexpectedly received £1000 (~$1500), how 
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much would you choose to spend at the current time and how much would you save for the future?” 
Participants were then debriefed, thanked and dismissed. 
 
Results 
Visual Bodily Awareness 
 An independent samples t-test revealed an effect of Visual Perspective on participants’ 
ratings of bodily awareness during the imaginary experience, such that awareness was higher 
following third-person (M = 5.32, SD = 1.96) than first-person (M = 4.30, SD = 2.10) imagery, t(98) 
= 2.51, p = .014, d = 0.50 , 95% CI: [0.21, 1.83]. 
 
Savings 
 An independent samples t-test yielded an effect of Visual Perspective on the proportion of 
money participants were prepared to save (vs. spend), such that savings were greater following 
third-person (M = .65, SD = .30) than first-person (M = .51, SD = .36) imagery, t(98) = 2.11, p 
= .037, d = 0.42 , 95% CI: [.01, .27]. 
 
Mediation by Visual Bodily Awareness 
 Regression analyses were undertaken to test whether bodily awareness mediated the relation 
between Visual Perspective and savings (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Hayes, 2012). The results revealed 
that visual awareness of the body uniquely predicted how much participants were prepared to save 
for the future (B = 0.06, SE = 0.02, p < .0001). However, when bodily awareness was included 
simultaneously in the model, the relation between Visual Perspective and savings was eliminated (B 
= 0.08, SE = 0.06, ns). Bootstrapping procedures (5000 re-samples) were used to test the 
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significance of the indirect effect. These confirmed that visual bodily awareness exerted a 
significant indirect effect on savings (indirect effect = 0.06; 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals, 
CI: [.01, .14], see Figure 1).   
 
------------------------ 





 Extending prior research (Hershfield, 2011), these findings support the hypothesis that, via 
shifts in awareness of the body, future savings are increased when one’s self is imagined from a 
third-person rather than a first-person vantage point. Moreover, visual salience during mental 
imagery mediates the relation between vantage point and the amount of money participants are 
prepared to save (vs. spend). Together with the results of Experiment 1, this suggests that mental 
imagery exerts considerable influence on the outcomes of intertemporal choices.  
 
General Discussion 
 Acknowledging the widening gap between life expectancy and post-retirement savings, here 
we explored how a basic facet of mental imagery — spatial visual perspective — can influence 
decisions to spend now or save for the future. In two studies, our findings revealed the potential 
financial benefits of imagining one’s future self from a third-person vantage point. First, savings 
were elevated when a distant-future event (i.e., beach walk) was spontaneously generated from a 
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third-person rather than a first-person perspective (Expt. 1). Second, adoption of a third-person (vs. 
first-person) vantage point during guided visual imagery increased savings via heightened 
awareness of one’s appearance as an older adult (Expt. 2). Thus, whether encountered in an 
immersive environment (Hershfield et al., 2011) or generated in the mind’s eye, visual exposure to 
one’s future self influences the products of intertemporal choice. As Hershfield (2011, p. 401) has 
reported, “when the future self is imbued with realism and vividness…people are more willing to 
make sacrifices today that may benefit them at some point in the years to come.” 
 The current findings are noteworthy for several reasons. Previously, it has been suggested 
that mental imagery may neither be a popular nor indeed effective strategy for previewing one’s 
future self (Hershfield et al., 2011). Here, we provide preliminary evidence to challenge questions 
of efficacy; however, it is perhaps easy to see why imagery has not, yet, become wildly popular. 
Although capable of imagining the myriad physical changes that accompany aging, individuals may 
rarely do so either because of its difficulty or because of the potentially unflattering self-portrayals 
it yields (e.g., ‘I’ve put on 40 pounds’). In addition, even when one’s future self is imagined, it may 
not be in a manner conducive to influencing intertemporal choice. For example, young adults may 
seldom preview themselves in their post-retirement years (i.e., preferring to imagine near future 
events) and on the odd occasion when they do the resultant imagery may be abstract and schematic 
in nature rather than concrete and visual (Libby & Eibach, 2011; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). 
Countering these observations however, as demonstrated herein, when distant future events are 
simulated from a third-person (vs. first-person) vantage point, mental imagery does appear to 
influence people’s decisions (albeit hypothetical) to save or spend. Given that many individuals 
tend to naturally simulate the distant future from a third-person perspective (Macrae et al., 2015; 
Pronin & Ross, 2006), the challenges may reside in getting them to imagine situations far beyond 
the here-and-now and ensuring they do so in ways that promote self-continuity (Hershfield, 2011). 
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 That third-person imagery is the favored strategy when imagining distant future events 
(Macrae et al., 2015; Pronin & Ross, 2006) raises an interesting question when considering the 
current findings. Specifically, if people predominantly adopt a third-person vantage point when 
simulating the distant future (see Expt. 1), might there be costs (e.g., negative affect, cognitive load) 
associated with adopting a non-preferred perspective (i.e., first-person perspective) that impact 
saving? While the current work cannot rule out this possibility, it seems unlikely that decreased 
mood or cognitive load would be driving the effects seen here for a couple of reasons. First, 
although people routinely report simulating events from a single perspective (Libby & Eibach, 
2011), research has shown that they are quite capable of adopting both viewpoints and periodically 
switch from one vantage point to another (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Heubner & Fredrickson, 1999; 
Rice & Rubin, 2009; Robinson & Swanson, 1993). Moreover, while third-person imagery may 
prevail when simulating the distant future (Expt. 1), an estimated 60.5% of individuals in western 
cultures spontaneously adopt a first-person perspective when their minds wander (Christian et al., 
2013), suggesting this vantage point is a very familiar mode of simulation. Second, compared to a 
third-person perspective, first-person imagery is accompanied by greater sensorimotor activity, 
which often translates to a richer affective experience (Christian et al., 2015; Kross, Ayduk, & 
Mischel, 2005; Verduyn, Van Mechelen, Kross, Chezzi, & Van Bever, 2012). Imagining a positive 
event (e.g., a beach walk) is therefore likely to be less positive if viewed from a third-person 
vantage point, as it reduces the visceral (e.g., pain/pleasure) intensity of the imagined event 
(Christian et al., 2015). Nevertheless, to address the wider implications of instructing a specific 
visual perspective, research would benefit from measures that tap the consequences of adopting a 
non-favored vantage point during mental simulation.  
 The benefits of third-person imagery extend beyond future saving decisions. Compared to 
when events are generated from a first-person perspective, third-person imagery protects the self 
from maladaptive forms of introspection (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Kross et al., 2005), increases 
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achievement motivation (Vasquez & Buehler, 2007), diminishes egocentrism (Golubickis, Tan, 
Falben, & Macrae, 2016; Macrae et al., 2016), attenuates the planning fallacy (Buehler, Griggin, 
Lam, & Deslauriers, 2012), reduces dietary temptation and consumption (Christian et al., 2016), 
and facilitates actions consistent with self-conceptualizations (Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005; 
Libby, Valenti, Pfent, & Eibach, 2011; Libby et al., 2014). In the current investigation, third-person 
imagery fostered saving by increasing awareness of one’s body. It is worth noting, however, that 
increased bodily awareness during imaginary experiences can also precipitate some decidedly 
undesirable outcomes — most notably, the problem of self-objectification. Objectification theory 
(Frederickson & Roberts, 1997) strives to understand the causes and consequences of bodily 
dissatisfaction that are so prevalent among women in Western society. According to this theoretical 
account, self-objectifying women engage in habitual body surveillance (i.e., third-person imagery), 
resulting in discontent, shame, and lowered self-esteem. As such, it would be inappropriate to 
trumpet third-person imagery as a panacea for people’s judgmental failings. Depending upon the 
specific task circumstances and decisions at hand, it is probable that this imagery perspective can 
either help or hinder social-cognitive functioning and self-construal (Christian, Miles, Parkinson, & 
Macrae, 2013). 
 Extending basic demonstrations of vantage-point differences in cognition and behavior (e.g., 
Macrae et al., 2013), recent research has sought to elucidate the specific mechanisms through which 
these effects arise. To date, a couple of prominent pathways have been identified. As previously 
noted, Libby et al. (2014) have demonstrated important vantage-point effects in the accessibility of 
different types of information. Specifically, whereas first-person imagery facilitates access to 
associative evaluations of a simulated event, third-person imagery increases reliance on 
propositional self-knowledge (Libby & Eibach, 2011). Complementing this work, elsewhere it has 
been shown that first-person simulations are accompanied by richer sensorimotor experiences than 
their third-person equivalents (Christian et al., 2016; Christian et al., 2015; Macrae et al., 2016; 
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Miles, Christian, Masilamani, Volpi, & Macrae, 2014). Rather than operating independently, it is 
likely these cognitive and sensorimotor processes work in tandem during mental simulation. Take, 
for example, the current findings. Although awareness of the body mediated the relation between 
vantage point and savings, it is possible that propositional self-knowledge (e.g., ‘financial stability 
is important to me’), accessed via third-person imagery, also contributed to the emergence of this 
effect (Libby et al., 2014). A useful task for future research will therefore be to explicate how 
vantage point influences the diverse components of psychological construal (Trope & Liberman, 
2003, 2010) and how these in turn impact self-continuity and intertemporal choice.   
 In exploring how visual perspective influences intertemporal choice, the current 
investigation comprises an interesting beginning. Nevertheless, to establish the generality and scope 
of the effects observed, further research is required. Several lines of inquiry would be useful. For 
example, work should consider the effects of visual perspective on fine-grained measures of 
temporal discounting together with actual rates of saving outside the laboratory (Bartels & Rips, 
2010; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009a). In standard discounting tasks, participants must choose 
between a smaller immediate reward (e.g., $2,000 to $25,000) and a delayed larger reward (e.g., 
$75,000 to $100,000), over variable temporal intervals (e.g., 35 to 50 years). Based on their 
decisions and application of the popular hyperbolic function as a model to describe the decline of 
subjective value with increasing delays (Mazur, 1987), it is possible to calculate a discount 
parameter (i.e., k) that varies across participants. This discount parameter expresses the steepness of 
the discounting function and the rate of decline in the value of rewards (i.e., larger values of k 
signify greater temporal discounting). Of specific interest would be the extent to which discount 
rates are influenced by the vantage point (i.e., first-person vs. third-person) adopted during future-
related imagery.  
 In addition, it would also be valuable to explore if differences in the structural 
characteristics of imaginary experiences are associated with the accumulation of wealth (and indeed 
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other resources) in everyday settings. Revealing vantage-point effects on hypothetical financial 
decisions is one thing, demonstrating that these differences extend to actual saving behavior in the 
real world a quite different (and important) matter (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009a). When 
considering vantage-point differences in financial judgments, it would also be interesting to reframe 
the decision such that the positive option (i.e., saving) is associated with benefits in the here-and-
now rather than distant future. Elsewhere, Segar, Eccles, and Richardson (2011) have advocated 
rebranding health promotion to focus more on the immediate than remote advantages of healthy 
behaviors. Guiding this suggestion is the observation that immediate payoffs serve as a stronger 
motivation for certain behaviors than distant goals. Exploring how vantage point differences in 
visual imagery moderate the appeal of saving for the present will be a valuable addition to the 
literature. 
 Given reported cultural, individual, and contextual variation in the adoption of imagery 
perspectives and future-self connectivity (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; Christian et al., 
2013; Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, & Leung, 2007; Zhang, Kong, Zhang, & Li 2015), it will be 
essential for further research to investigate how these factors influence intertemporal choice. For 
example, do cultural differences (i.e., collectivist vs. individualistic) in the adoption of imagery 
perspectives impact rates of saving at a societal level? To date, the prevalence of first- and third-
person visual perspectives has not be studied extensively in Eastern societies (Christian et al., 2013), 
although Asian-Americans have been shown to utilize a third-person vantage point more readily 
than Euro-Americans during memory retrieval (Cohen et al., 2007). Of interest, therefore, will be 
research exploring the extent to which cultural differences in vantage point shape people’s financial 
decisions and actual saving behavior. Similarly, differences across the lifespan offer another 
important topic for investigation. Notwithstanding the composition of the current sample, younger 
adults have a tendency to be present-focused (Addis et al., 2008); precisely the mind set that may 
obscure the desirability of saving for the future. It will be valuable, therefore, to explore how 
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differences in future-connectivity shape both the process and products of mental simulation across 
cultures and individuals.    
 If future-self continuity holds the key to reducing temporal discounting and improving 
saving, of critical importance is how psychological connectivity with one’s prospective self is 
assessed. Adapted from relationships research (Aaron, Aaron, & Smollan, 1992), the most common 
method to date has been to require participants to choose a set of Euler circles (i.e., current self vs. 
future self) that range from depicting no overlap between the selves to almost complete overlap (see 
Supplemental Online Material). Importantly, this approach has been successful both when the basis 
of future similarity is unspecified (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009a) and when it is tied to specific 
personal attributes (e.g., beliefs, values; Bartels & Rips, 2010). Given current emphasis on the 
visual salience of one’s appearance as an older adult (Hershfield et al., 2011), bodily awareness 
seemed like a direct and appropriate proxy for estimates of future-self continuity. It is likely that 
probing levels of awareness cemented the idea that participants were viewing the self in the future 
rather than another person (Hershfield, 2011; Pronin & Ross, 2006). In this way, the current 
measure represents more than a check on the manipulation of visual perspective. Indeed, it is 
possible to generate actions in which first-person imagery may elevate visual awareness of one’s 
body, such as simulations of undressing, showering, and trimming one’s toenails. The critical 
distinction is one of degree. Whereas first-person imagery typically (although not always) elevates 
experiential awareness (Christian et al., 2015), third-person imagery typically (although not always) 
increases visual awareness of one’s physical body (Frederickson & Roberts, 1997).      
 Exclusive reliance on explicit (i.e., self-report) measures of self-continuity, however, may 
fail to capture the diverse and nuanced ways in which people are connected with their future selves. 
In this regard, much could be gained from the development and application of implicit measures to 
chart changes in self-continuity through time and how these are influenced by the specific 
components of self (e.g., physical self, psychological self) under consideration (Quoidbach, Gilbert, 
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& Wilson, 2013). In addition, bodily awareness can take a variety of forms. Aside from 
appreciation of one’s physical appearance, mental imagery can also furnish kinaesthetic, 
interoceptive, and propositional information (e.g., Callow & Hardy, 2004; Christian et al., 2015; 
Libby et al., 2014). What is more, these components display systematic variation as a function of 
the vantage point adopted. For example, whereas interoceptive awareness is heightened following 
the adoption of a first-person (vs. third-person) vantage point (Christian et al., 2015), kinaesthetic 
imagery has been associated with a third-person (vs. first-person) viewpoint (Callow & Hardy, 
2004). Therefore, whether bodily awareness aids or hinders decision-making likely reflects the 
complex interplay of several factors, including the specific experiential aspects of mental imagery 
under consideration, the task context, and the person running the mental simulation.              
 
Conclusion 
 People retire earlier, live longer, and yet save less than they ever did before. Noting the 
tensions this can create, here we demonstrated that, via enhanced awareness of the body, adoption 
of a third-person (vs. first-person) vantage point during future-related imagery can encourage 
prudence, such that saving for the future is more attractive than spending in the present. What this 
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Footnotes 
1Potentially widening consumer access to basic immersive technology, Sony’s PlayStation VR 
Headset currently retails at $399. In addition, for as little as $0.99 people can preview their elderly 
face using apps such as AgingBooth. 
 
2An a priori sample size calculation based on the average effect size reported by Hershfield et al. 
(2011) - G*Power, d = 0.67, α = .05, power = 80%) revealed a requirement of 98 participants. This 
sample size is consistent with previous research exploring the effects of perspective taking and 
temporal construal on mental simulation (e.g., Libby et al., 2014; Macrae et al., 2015).   
 
 
   
